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INTRODUCTION
During the 2011–2012 election cycle, Shaun McCutcheon contributed
$33,088 to sixteen different candidates for federal office.1 McCutcheon’s
donations complied with the base limits the Federal Election Commission
(FEC) set for contributions to individual candidates.2 McCutcheon
wanted to contribute more but was barred by the FEC’s aggregate limit
on contributions.3 In June of 2012, McCutcheon and the Republication
National Committee (RNC) filed a complaint before a three-judge panel
of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.4 McCutcheon and
the RNC claimed that the aggregate limits on contributions to candidates
and political committees were unconstitutional under the First
Amendment.5 The three-judge panel granted the Government’s motion to
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.B.A. and B.A.,
2012, Emory University. Thank you to my family for loving and supporting me unconditionally
throughout my life. Thank you to the staff of the Florida Law Review for their diligent editing.
Finally, thank you to Professor Charles W. Collier, whose SCOTUS workshop seminar was
responsible for creating this Comment.
1. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1443 (2014).
2. Id. The base limits were codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)–(2) (2012) (to be recodified
on Jan. 1, 2016 as 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)–(2)).
3. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1443.
4. Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, McCutcheon v. FEC,
893 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 1:12-cv-01034-JEB-JRB-RLW); McCutcheon, 893 F.
Supp. 2d 133, rev’d and remanded, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
5. McCutcheon, 893 F. Supp. at 135, 137. The limits prevent individuals from contributing
more than $37,500 in total to candidates and their authorized committees, and $57,500 “in the
case of any other contributions, of which not more than $37,500 may be attributable to
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dismiss, holding that the aggregate limits are constitutional because they
prevent circumvention of the base limits.6 McCutcheon and the RNC then
appealed directly to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1253.7 The
Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision and struck down the
aggregate campaign contribution limits—established by the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA)8—on the grounds that the limits
were an unnecessary burden on freedom of association under the First
Amendment.9 The Court observed that the environment of campaign
finance disclosure was far more transparent in the age of the Internet.10
The Court reasoned that the Internet allows access to an unprecedented
level of information regarding campaign contributions and may actually
render certain outdated campaign finance restrictions moot.11
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF DISCLOSURE IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE
Congress took its first major stab at comprehensive campaign finance
reform in 1971 with FECA.12 This Act restricted “the amount of money
that candidates could personally contribute to their campaigns, limited
what could be spent on media advertising, and required disclosure of

contributions to political committees which are not political committees of national political
parties.” 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3) (to be recodified on Jan. 1, 2016 as 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(3)).
6. McCutcheon, 893 F. Supp. at 140–42.
7. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1444 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1253).
8. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–457 (to be recodified on Jan. 1, 2016 as 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30146).
The specific provision containing the aggregate limits is 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3).
9. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1456, 1462.
10. Brief of Cause of Action Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 11–12,
17, McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (No. 12-536), 2013 WL 2102847 [hereinafter
Cause of Action Brief]. The majority decision in McCutcheon cited this brief in support of its
argument. 134 S. Ct. at 1460.
11. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1460.
12. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified
as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–457). While FECA was arguably the first comprehensive federal
campaign finance law, one of the very first federal campaign finance measures was the Publicity
of Political Contributions Act of 1910, which called for limited disclosure of receipts and
expenditures in elections for the U.S. House of Representatives. See Richard Briffault, Campaign
Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273, 273 (2010). The first federal attempt at piecemeal
campaign finance reform was the Tillman Act of 1907, 34 Stat. 864. But weak enforcement and
a plethora of loopholes made the Tillman Act virtually worthless in stemming the tide of corporate
money. See Francis Bingham, Show Me the Money: Public Access and Accountability After
Citizens United, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1027, 1048 (2011). Congress attempted to remedy the
weaknesses of the law by passing various statutes that predated FECA, none of which were
comprehensive in their own right. See Jessica Furst, Money and Politics: Will Expenditure Limits
Take Candidates out of the Money Race and Put Them Back in the Office?, 59 FLA. L. REV. 873,
881 (2007).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss4/12

2

Kats: Because, the Internet: The Limits of Online Campaign Finance Disc

2015]

CASE COMMENT

1515

campaign contributions and expenditures.”13 Despite the seeming
comprehensiveness of the initial restrictions, the Watergate scandal
prompted another round of reforms very soon after FECA’s initial
passage and resulted in the 1974 amendments to FECA.14 These
amendments represent the origin of the contribution caps that would
ultimately be at issue in McCutcheon.15
Almost immediately following the 1974 FECA amendments,
disgruntled politicians challenged the contribution caps in the landmark
case of Buckley v. Valeo.16 The politicians argued that limits on
contributions and expenditures violated the First Amendment rights of
candidates and their donors.17 Although the Buckley opinion addressed
numerous facets of campaign finance law, the Court focused on the
constitutionality of FECA disclosure requirements.18 The Buckley Court
upheld these requirements, articulating numerous government interests in
stopping corruption,19 but noted that disclosure, was “only a partial
measure” and insufficient to prevent corruption.20
Political parties were ultimately able to circumvent FECA by using
“soft money” and “issue advocacy.”21 These twin concerns would lead to
yet another round of amendments to FECA—the Bipartisan Campaign
13. Brandi Cherie Sablatura, Reformation of 527 Organizations: Closing the Soft Money
Loophole Created by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 66 LA. L. REV. 809, 817
(2006).
14. FECA Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (amending FECA, 86
Stat. 3); Anthony Corrado, The Promise of Campaign Finance Reform Has Largely Been Broken,
N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/06/13/did-any-goodcome-of-watergate/the-promise-of-campaign-reform-has-largely-been-broken.
15. FECA Amendments § 101.
16. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
17. Id. at 11.
18. Id. at 68.
19. Id. at 25, 66–67, 143. In its holding, the Court relied on the “conclusion that the
requirement was narrowly tailored to . . . providing voters with information about candidates;
deterring actual corruption and the appearance thereof by exposing large contributions and
expenditures to the light of publicity; and facilitating government data-gathering necessary to
detect violations of [FECA’s] contribution limits.” Lindsey Powell, Getting Around
Circumvention: A Proposal for Taking FECA Online, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1499, 1530 (2006).
Importantly, the Court described disclosure as “the least restrictive means of curbing the evils of
campaign ignorance and corruption.” Id. at 1529 (emphasis added) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at
68).
20. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28.
21. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 123, 126 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United
v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010). Soft money is “money donated to the national parties to
support state and local grassroots organizing or get out the vote efforts.” Daniel W. Butrymowicz,
Loophole.com: How the FEC’s Failure to Fully Regulate the Internet Undermines Campaign
Finance Law, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1708, 1714 (2009). Issue advocacy refers to “ads attacking
candidates for their position on a specific issue rather than advocating their defeat.” Id. at 1715.
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Reform Act (BCRA).22 Like FECA, BCRA was an expansion of
disclosure standards, extending FECA’s disclosure requirements to
corporations, labor unions, and individuals who fund “electioneering
communications.”23 In 2003, the Supreme Court upheld this new ambit
of regulations in McConnell v. FEC.24 Seven years later, the Court
adhered to its McConnell pronouncements in Citizens United v. FEC,
where the appellant sought to advertise a documentary it made about
Hillary Clinton in anticipation of the 2008 U.S. presidential election.25
The appellant in Citizens United challenged both a disclosure provision
that would require it to submit an identification statement to the FEC and
a provision mandating disclaimers during advertisements.26 The Court
affirmed both requirements.27 In the Citizens United majority opinion,
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote, “With the advent of the Internet, prompt
disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the
information needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable
for their positions and supporters.”28 By the time Citizens United was
decided in 2010, the Internet had become the primary platform for
campaign finance disclosure in the United States.29 The newfound
accessibility of disclosure prompted the Cause of Action Institute to
submit an amicus brief in McCutcheon that was dedicated to describing
the changing technological climate:
[T]he development of free, on-line disclosure reports and
cumulative
databases
puts
previously-inaccessible
information at the fingertips of even the least sophisticated
analysts. For example, the FEC maintains a free on-line
22. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 12
U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 36 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C.). This law is known as “the McCain-Feingold Act”
after its two sponsors, Senators John McCain and Russ Feingold. McCain-Feingold Showdown,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/30/opinion/mccain-feingoldshowdown.html.
23. Id. §§ 201–203. The BCRA defines an “electioneering communication” as a “broadcast,
cable, or satellite communication” that mentions a candidate within sixty days of a general
election or thirty days of a primary election. Id. § 201(3)(A).
24. 540 U.S. at 196, 201. Most interestingly, the Court seemed to recognize that a
competing First Amendment right existed to counterbalance the desires of those who wished to
contribute political money anonymously—“the competing First Amendment interests of
individual citizens seeking to make informed choices in the political marketplace.” Id. at 197
(internal quotation marks omitted).
25. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887.
26. Id. at 913–14.
27. Id. at 914.
28. Id. at 916.
29. Cf. John M. de Figueiredo & Elizabeth Garrett, Paying for Politics, 78 S. CAL. L. REV.
591, 625–26 (2005) (“Bruce Bimber and Richard Davis identify 2000 as the year when the Internet
began to dramatically affect political campaigns.”).
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database of election contributions, often reported within
hours of the contribution. The FEC makes available free data
downloads for further data mining. The Department of
Justice uses the FEC database as its primary research tool to
uncover instances of campaign contribution abuse.30
This is a far cry from how disclosure worked in the days when Buckley
was decided. Prior to the advent of the Internet, disclosure reports were
available only on paper.31 To obtain a disclosure report, one had to go to
the Public Records Office of the FEC, which operated as a “store-front
facility.”32 The first computer indices that would have been available
when Buckley was decided were “primitive.”33 The paper system meant
that the millions of pages generated by the FEC’s reporting requirements
only reached a small number of people.34
II. MCCUTCHEON AND THE INCREASING POWER OF THE INTERNET
Chief Justice John Roberts’s majority opinion in McCutcheon went
even further than Justice Kennedy’s in Citizens United, stating that
“disclosure of contributions minimizes the potential for abuse of the
campaign finance system.”35 Justice Roberts dismissed Buckley’s
characterization of disclosure requirements as “only a partial measure,”
reasoning that the Internet now allows disclosure to be a much more
potent tool against corruption than it had been when Buckley was
decided.36 The existing system of campaign finance disclosure—the FECoperated online database that OpenSecrets.org and FollowTheMoney.org
often accessed—“minimize[d] the potential for abuse of the campaign
finance system.”37 The contribution limits at issue in McCutcheon may
have been harsh enough to encourage politicians to hide any money in
excess of those limits.38 Because of McCutcheon, the Internet is now
offered as a self-sustaining legal argument in campaign finance litigation.
The Internet’s existence is a standalone reason for the repeal of
regulations developed at a time when the average person simply had no
access to campaign finance information. It is, therefore, of paramount
importance to address the limitations of what the Internet actually does
for campaign finance disclosure.
30. Cause of Action Brief, supra note 10, at 18 (footnotes omitted).
31. See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FIRST TEN YEARS REPORT 9 (1985), available at
http://fec.gov/pdf/firsttenyearsreport.pdf.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Cause of Action Brief, supra note 10, at 15.
35. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1459 (2014).
36. Id. at 1460.
37. Id. at 1459–60.
38. See id. at 1460–61.
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III. THE LIMITS OF PURE DISCLOSURE
Justice Roberts’s analysis of disclosure in McCutcheon is overly
simplistic and potentially harmful to the future development of campaign
finance laws. There are three problems that suggest the Court’s view—
that online disclosure of campaign finances will prevent corruption—
must not be used as a standalone reason for striking down election laws.
The first problem with relying on internet disclosure is one of
aggregation. Disclosing large amounts of data online presupposes that
someone will actually examine that data. Unfortunately, the average voter
is either uninterested or unwilling to do this legwork. The effectiveness
of a campaign finance regime “relies on the willingness of intermediaries
like the media or interest groups to examine the available information and
present it to the public in a usable form before the election.”39 In 2007,
Professor Dick M. Carpenter II conducted a study on the effectiveness of
disclosure in ballot issue elections.40 Part of the study was a threequestion survey designed to measure knowledge and use of disclosure
information.41 According to Carpenter, “[l]ess than half of respondents
reported being informed about laws governing contributions to issue
campaigns,” and just over one-third of respondents actually “knew where
to access lists of campaign contributors” or read these lists before casting
their vote.42 This lack of knowledge, however, did not correlate at all with
respondents’ support for general campaign finance disclosure, suggesting
that “citizens appear to know nothing about a law they strongly support
and appear uninterested in accessing the information it produces.”43
The most apparent reason for this inaction is the volume of
information available.44 Even candidates who run for minor positions
have many contributors to report.45 The cost of determining which donors

39. Briffault, supra note 12, at 288.
40. Dick M. Carpenter II, Disclosure Costs: Unintended Consequences of Campaign
Finance Reform, INST. FOR JUSTICE 11 (2007), https://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/other_pubs
/DisclosureCosts.pdf.
41. Id. at 11 tbl.2. The three questions, framed as propositions that respondents had to agree
or disagree with, were:
1) I am informed about the laws governing contributions to ballot issue
campaigns in the state; 2) I know where to access lists of those who contribute
to ballot issue campaigns in my state; 3) Before I vote on ballot issues, I usually
check out the list of contributors to the respective campaigns.
Id.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id. at 11, 20 n.39.
Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures About Disclosure, 44 IND. L. REV. 255, 266 (2010).
Id.
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on a massive list are likely to create corruption is too high for the average
voter.46
Individual voters’ reluctance to sift through the disclosure information
is compounded by intermediaries who will do the work for them. In the
age of paper disclosure reports, voters often relied on journalists to attain
and process the information.47 The modern age is no different in that
respect, with journalists, traditional news networks, and online pundits
sifting through the FEC’s online database.48 Professor Richard Briffault
notes that “[t]he real benefit from disclosure may be public education
generally rather than voter information specifically. When collected and
analyzed by reporters, bloggers, scholars, good government
organizations, and competing interest groups . . . disclosure reports can
help provide a vital primer on the influence of money in law. . . .”49
If, however, the true benefit of online disclosure is having campaign
disclosure data disseminated by third parties, then some degree of bias in
that data’s presentation seems unavoidable. For example, the goodgovernment organizations responsible for a great deal of the disclosure
of “money in politics” also have their own agenda—promoting generally
stricter campaign regulations.50 Traditional media abounds with
examples of poor presentation of campaign finance information. The
work of Professor Stephen Ansolabehere, Erik C. Snowberg, and
Professor James M. Snyder Jr. suggests that voters already have a skewed
perception of campaign finance that correlates with media coverage.51
Ansolabehere, Snowberg, and Snyder compared newspaper coverage of
expenditures and contributions with the actual contribution and
expenditure figures.52 Their results suggest that newspapers were not
presenting accurate information.53 The study also noted that:
“Expenditures reported in the papers are approximately three to five times
larger than the reality. The amounts spent on television advertising are
46. Justin M. Sadowsky, The Transparency Myth: A Conceptual Approach to Corruption
and the Impact of Mandatory Disclosure Laws, 4 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 308, 332 (2005).
47. See, e.g., Wayne Barrett, City for Sale: Ed Koch and the Betrayal of New York, THE
NATION INST. (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.nationinstitute.org/featuredwork/books/1287/city_for_
sale:_ed_koch_and_the_betrayal_of_new_york/.
48. See Mayer, supra note 44, at 267 (“MSNBC sifted through federal contributor data to
identify journalists who had made federal political contributions, often in apparent violation of
their employers’ stated policies.”).
49. Briffault, supra note 12, at 299.
50. Robert F. Bauer, Not Just a Private Matter: The Purposes of Disclosure in an Expanded
Regulatory System, 6 ELECTION L.J. 38, 52–53 (2007).
51. Stephen Ansolabehere, Erik C. Snowberg & James M. Snyder Jr., Unrepresentative
Information: The Case of Newspaper Reporting on Campaign Finance, 69 PUB. OP. Q. 213
(2005).
52. Id. at 227.
53. Id.
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much smaller than reported. And congressional challengers spend much,
much less than is presented in the press.”54 Political blogs that use
campaign finance information are often nakedly biased in their political
leanings.55 If these blogs were to act as middlemen between the public
and the FEC, then they might frame the campaign finance information to
suit their ideology.
The second problem with using internet disclosure as a standalone
reason for striking down campaign finance regulations is that disclosure
does not actually empower voters to do anything. A voter has no recourse
to take action against an unsavory organization donating to a political
candidate. Unlike the FEC, a voter has no power to impose sanctions on
a candidate for corruption.56 One vote hardly has the stopping power of
the contribution ceilings at issue in McCutcheon.57 Consequently, even
when a voter has knowledge of potentially illegal donations, there is little
a single voter can do about it. The problem becomes acute when
considering “bet hedging.”58 A donor might give money to sources in
multiple parties, to multiple candidates within the same party, or to
competing candidates in the same election cycle.59 In such a situation, the
voter is stripped of any genuine power. Apart from hedging, campaign
finance may not be as important to voters as other issues. If a candidate

54. Id. at 219. The researchers’ findings on contributions were equally troubling. Ansolabehere
and his coauthors asked 1200 adults to estimate the sources and amounts of House of
Representatives campaign funds. Id. at 225. Respondents believed that interest groups contributed
fifty percent more money than individuals, but in fact individual contributions account for more
than half of all reported contributions to House and Senate races. Id. at 226. Perhaps the most
telling part of the research is that the margins of the respondents’ overestimations were equivalent
to the overestimations in the newspapers. Id. at 225.
55. There are far too many examples to list of political blogs that either openly market
themselves as favoring one side of the political spectrum or have authors with well-known
political leanings. See, e.g., DAILY KOS, http://www.dailykos.com/ (last visited July 1, 2015);
GATEWAY PUNDIT, http://www.thegatewaypundit.com/ (last visited July 1, 2015); HOTAIR,
http://www.hotair.com/ (last visited July 1, 2015); VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, http://www.washington
post.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/ (last visited July 1, 2015); THINKPROGRESS, http://thinkprogress.
org/ (last visited July 1, 2015).
56. Briffault, supra note 12, at 288–89.
57. Id.; McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1460 (2014).
58. Jason Cohen, The Same Side of Two Coins: The Peculiar Phenomenon of Bet-Hedging
in Campaign Finance, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 271, 275 (2006) (discussing the practice of donors
contributing to competing parties or candidates so that the donor enjoys some benefit regardless
of who wins the election).
59. Id. at 274. There are many somewhat speculative reasons as to why donors hedge their
bets in elections. The most cynical rationale would be ex-post favor seeking—a donor believing
that each candidate in a race is able and willing to give him some kind of political favor. Id. at
306. A donor could also donate to multiple candidates to express neutrality or to promote
democracy. Id. at 307. But for this Comment’s purposes, the result is the same.
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is funded by suspect donors but takes a favorable social stance, then
voters may still vote for that candidate, despite the perceived corruption.60
The final problem with internet disclosure as a standalone reason for
striking down campaign finance regulations is that disclosure may
discourage participation, particularly donations to an unpopular cause. As
a result, political money may avoid the spotlight and rely on backchannels
rather than traditional avenues. In this way, too much disclosure may
actually decrease transparency. The Supreme Court acknowledged the
idea that disclosure decreases participation in NAACP v. Alabama.61 In
that case, there was significant evidence that membership in the NAACP
led to retaliation against the members.62 Thus, the Court found that
compulsory disclosure of the NAACP’s members infringed on the
members’ freedom of association.63 The Buckley Court acknowledged
that disclosure has a chilling effect on political participation, at least in
terms of disclosure requirements for minor parties and independents.64
A clear example of the way disclosure may chill political participation
is the Proposition 8 ballot initiative in California.65 Because of
Proposition 8’s unpopularity, supporters of the measure became targets
for death threats.66 “[A]version to public exposure particularly deters
60. Briffault explained this dilemma by using an example from the Clinton/Dole election
of 1996: “[Voters] could not vote for Dole on campaign finance, or on character, and for Clinton
on economic policy or health care reform, but rather had to combine all their conflicting
concerns . . . . The vote is simply too blunt an instrument . . . .” Briffault, supra note 12, at 289.
61. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
62. Id. at 462.
63. Id.
64. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 71–72 (1976). In fact, the Court respected the threat of
chilling to such a degree that the standard for disclosure exemption is reasonableness. Id. at 74.
For an example of the Court applying reasonableness in this context, see Brown v. Socialist
Workers ’74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87 (1982) (holding that disclosure requirements
applied to a minor party would subject the members to a serious threat of retaliation). Concededly,
the Supreme Court has upheld contribution limits over the First Amendment interest in anonymity
before. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914–16 (2010); McConnell v. FEC, 540
U.S. 93, 194–202 (2003); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 60–74. However, the laxity of the standard is, if
nothing else, an indicator that chilling must be considered.
65. Proposition 8 was a 2008 ballot measure that banned gay marriage in California through
amendment of the state’s constitution. Petitioners’ Brief at 2, Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010)
(No. 09-559), 2010 WL 711186. The measure immediately set off a firestorm in California, a
comparatively liberal state. Eric McGhee & Daniel Krimm, California’s Political Geography, PUB.
POLICY INST. OF CAL. (Feb. 2012), http://www.ppic.org/main/publication_quick.
asp?i=1007. Pursuant to California law at the time, the names and zip codes of all donors to the
initiative were posted online and made publically accessible. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 18550
(2006).
66. See Andres Araiza, Prop 8 Threat: Fresno Police Close to Arrest, ABC-30 (Oct. 31,
2008, 12:00 AM), http://abc30.com/archive/6479879/ (discussing a death threat directed at the
Fresno mayor for his support of Proposition 8). A federal court did eventually hold that the number
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persons from associating themselves with causes that are unpopular or
unconventional.”67 Naturally, disclosure may divert some stereotypically
large and “corrupt” contributors, but most donations to U.S. House and
Senate races are small.68 And large donors can simply bet on both
candidates to hedge and mitigate any backlash, whereas a smaller donor
may not be able to afford two donations to two candidates. Thus, the
chilling effect of disclosure mostly hurts small donors with unorthodox
views. The outcome will likely be disengagement from the contribution
process or increased use of backchannels.69 Pushing donors to give their
money to organizations with no reporting requirements runs counter to
the purpose of disclosure.
CONCLUSION
Disclosure was once considered a limited means of deterrence at best.
The average voter was unable to access paper campaign disclosure
reports due to technological constraints. Today, voters have the opposite
problem. Voters have more information than they know (or care to know)
what to do with. Despite these limitations, the brave new world of
technologically-empowered campaign finance is now being used as an
independent and sufficient reason to strike down campaign finance laws.
If the Court is to put forward technological process as grounds for
reforming antiquated laws, then, at the very least, it must acknowledge
the limitations of mere disclosure as a deterrent to corruption.

of violent acts against the Proposition 8 supporters were small in comparison to those acts that
were constitutionally protected—boycotts and protests. ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F.
Supp. 2d 1197, 1216 (E.D. Cal. 2009). However, this illustration still represents a concrete
example of how disclosure can be used against donors.
67. William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre’s Checkbook: Privacy Costs of Political
Contribution Disclosure, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 22 (2003).
68. Professor William McGeveran echoes this point: “[T]he corruption interest, like the
information interest, fails to justify disclosure of modest-sized contributions. Most donors are
small fry. Their negligible influence poses little danger of corruption, however defined.” Id. at 30
(footnote omitted).
69. An example of this is the 501(c)(4), an organization used in recent years to avoid
disclosure of political donations. Trevor Potter & Bryson B. Morgan, The History of Undisclosed
Spending in U.S. Elections & How 2012 Became the “Dark Money” Election, 27 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 383, 463 (2013) (“The importance of avoiding disclosure was key to
the decision by many groups to opt for the 501(c)(4) form.”).
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